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Executive summary:  
China has emerged as an important partner for Africa. Not surprisingly, Chinese business and 
investment relations with Africa have been growing. This paper contends that Africa offers a 
different proposition to Chinese business interests in non-African developing economies. In this 
optic, it takes a “comparative” institution-based view treating factors that determine Chinese 
multinationals’ cross-border merger and acquisition (CBMA) decisions as comparatively different 
for Africa to the rest of the developing world. From a panel data estimation of the number of 
Chinese cross-border mergers & acquisitions (CBMAs) from 2007 to 2016, we find of market size, 
natural resources, strategic assets, labor productivity and institutional governance, only natural 
resources and market size have a distinctive effect, with Chinese investors being more attracted to 
African natural resources than the African market. The drive for natural resources provides 
impetus for Chinese MNEs to choose CBMAs over greenfield investment, and through majority 
ownership to exercise control. Our inference is that Africa is ‘significantly’ different from other 
developing regions, in terms of CBMAs, as Chinese multinationals have a strong motive to control 
access to natural resources. 
Keywords: Chinese Multinationals, Acquisitions, Institutions, Africa, Natural Resources. 
 
1. Introduction 
China-Africa economic engagement has been rising in recent times. For example, China has 
become Africa’s largest trading partner replacing the US. Similarly, Chinese FDI in Africa has 
witnessed a substantial increase, for instance, in 2003, Chinese FDI to Africa was about 0.49 
billion US dollars, while the comparative number in 2018 was 46.1 billion (UNCTAD, 2019). Not 
surprisingly, the studies of Chinese FDI in Africa has garnered some interest (Biggeri and 
Sanfilippo, 2009, Kolstad and Wiig, 2011, Cheung et al., 2012, Chen et al., 2016, Mourao, 2018). 
However, a lesser known phenomenon is Chinese CBMAs in Africa. Though this type of 
investment or establishment mode is still a nascent part of growing Chinese CBMA in the world 
(relative to greenfield investment), it begs the question of how different Chinese CBMAs in 
African economies are to other developing countries. 
Our contribution is at the intersection of two streams of the literature: Chinese CBMAs and 
CBMAs in Africa – with emphasis on providing a comparative perspective between Africa and 
other developing regions. While there have been studies of CBMAs in the African context (e.g. 
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Oguji and Owusu, 2015; Degbey and Ellis, 2017), they mainly focus on CBMAs undertaken by 
developed economies’ firms but do not explore the subject of a developing economy, such as China, 
as the source of investment. In addition, African economies as an investment target market are 
different from other developing nations. To bridge the gap, we use a ‘comparative institution-based’ 
view to develop a theoretical framework of Chinese CBMAs in the non-African developing world 
and how they contrast with those in Africa. The antecedents of Chinese CBMA decisions are 
expounded in this context. We examine how market-seeking, resource-seeking, strategic assets-
seeking, and efficiency-seeking locational motives impinge on Chinese multinationals’ takeover 
and location decisions through this comparative institutional lens.  
This paper is motivated by two other questions. One is the difference between CBMA and 
greenfield investment. Motivations for CBMA can be quite distinct to that of greenfield investment 
and in fact, the so-called ‘strategic assets seeking motive' is often primarily seen as an acquisition 
motive (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). The next question is ownership strategy (voice and control) 
acquisition with an ownership strategy that allows voice and control, and that allows for voice only.  
A higher degree of managerial control granted by ownership stakes in target firms can be crucial 
for securing the control of acquired resources (Chari and Chang, 2009).    
The main contributions of this study are twofold. Firstly, it offers answers to the question 
of what shapes Chinese acquisitions, including both their entry strategies and ownership strategies 
in developing economies. Moreover, it deepens our understanding of whether Chinese investors 
treat Africa differently. There are broad implications to our answers. It has been argued that 
Chinese investment in Africa is incentivized by the pull of natural resources and that this occurs 
irrespective of the weak institutional setting of the continent, albeit with some challenges to this 
notion from some quarters (see Brautigam, 2009; Chen et al., 2018). Our study can shed light on 
this debate. 
This paper is organized as follows; Section 2 provides a brief theoretical background of 
CBMAs with special reference to China and sets up our hypotheses. We discuss the data and 
research methodology in Section 3. The results are highlighted in Section 4, followed by a 
concluding section. 
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses development 
2.1 Comparative institution-based view 
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Institutional theory suggests that business strategy and performance are affected by institutions, 
which are defined as cultural-cognitive, normative and regulative structures and activities (Scott, 
2013). Both formal rules and informal constraints of a particular institutional framework set up the 
rules that organizations, in conducting value-added activities, must follow (Scott, 2013; Dunning 
and Lundan, 2008). Institutional reconfiguration and upgrading deeply influence firms’ learning 
and resource allocative goals. For instance, an appropriate legal system structure, well-designed 
financial institutions and a well-protected intellectual property rights system are believed to 
facilitate the value-adding activities and economic growth of businesses (North, 2005). As such, 
determinants of MNE’s strategic choices extend beyond economic optimization and strategic 
justification to forces shaped by political, legal and social rules, and by the broader political context 
surrounding the decision to internationalize (Oliver, 1997; Peng et al., 2008).  
However, evidence shows that institutional development is highly path-dependent and 
institutions differ tremendously and systematically among countries (Djankov et al., 2003). Some 
African countries’ institutional framework is significantly weaker than other developing countries, 
representing particular challenges for MNEs. They often have poor regulatory systems, flawed 
judiciaries and unstable political systems that are still in the process of consolidation (Luiz and 
Stewart, 2014). For instance, Africa’s regional susceptibility to war index is 26.3%, compared to 
19.4% for Asia and 9.9% for the Western Hemisphere (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2003) and Africa’s 
regional average score of Corruption Perception Index is 3.2 out of 10 (with 1 being highly corrupt) 
compared to 4.4 for Asia and 6.6 for Western Europe (Transparency International, 2018), which 
indicate that the region is amongst the most politically unstable and corrupt worldwide. These 
institutional differences in comparison to other countries and their consequences for economic 
performance are of interest. Therefore, we need to rely on comparative information to understand 
how institutions affect MNEs differently across countries. This comparative institutional 
perspective that draws from comparative institutional analysis (Greif, 1998; Aoki and Rothwell, 
2013) is employed by this study.  
The comparative institution-based view of CBMAs shows that institutions regulatory or 
belief systems can underpin locational attractiveness of certain host countries and more 
importantly are situationally different across societies (see Dunning and Lundan, 2008 pp.137-
140). For African countries, their colonial history and ethno-linguistic fractionalization related 
sociopolitical instability create unique institutional contexts, which make them distinctive from 
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most other emerging markets (Ellis et al., 2018). In this regard, based on the widespread perception 
that Africa is structurally and institutionally different from the rest of the developing world and 
also confirmed by several studies that there is a differential impact of FDI in Africa (Asiedu, 2006), 
we argue that African economies will have a distinct effect on the level of Chinese CBMAs. 
Evidence shows that Africa receives significantly less FDI than other developing regions (Asiedu, 
2002; World Bank, 2014) and the fact that Africa has been relatively unsuccessful in attracting 
CBMAs compared to other developing regions (shown in Figure 1). In a similar vein we expect 
that an African country will be a less attractive destination for CBMAs compared to developing 
countries from other regions. Thus, we posit that:  
 
Hypothesis 1a: Broadly speaking, Africa is less attractive to Chinese CBMA compared to other 
developing regions.  
*** FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE *** 
 
A stable institutional environment should have a positive impact on CBMA investment. In 
this optic, clear laws and legal enforceability reduce costs related to information asymmetry and 
help investors pursue a cross-border deal (Dacin et al., 2002; Buckley et al., 2007). On the contrary, 
a weak institutional setting will be a deterrent to CBMAs, leading to a withdrawal of those 
investments (Asiedu and Villamil, 2000). However, in the case of China, Deng and Yang (2015) 
and Yang and Deng (2017) identify a negative effect of government effectiveness on the number 
of Chinese CBMAs, meaning the higher the effectiveness of government of a host country, the 
lower the number of Chinese CBMAs in such country. Similarly, Malhotra et al. (2010) observe a 
significantly positive relationship between the value of Chinese CBMAs and the level of perceived 
corruption in the target country. The explanation why emerging markets MNEs may invest in 
countries with weak institutions is twofold. 
First, companies that face a similar weak institutional environment at home, where there is 
an ‘institutional void’ (near absence of proper or lagging institutional rules), are well-equipped to 
invest in developing economies with similarly weak institutions (Chen et al., 2018). Secondly, 
developed economies firms avoiding countries with a weak institutional setting implies less 
competition for emerging markets MNEs to invest in these countries (Cheung et al., 2012). 
Thereby, we speculate that Chinese MNEs may be able and prefer to invest in developing countries 
with weak institutions. With regards to African countries, given the region’s weaker institutional 
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environment, a negative institutions-CBMAs link may be expected. However, Rogmans and 
Ebbers (2013) find an insignificant and negative association of business environmental risk with 
FDI in Africa, suggesting that investors are not deterred by Africa’s overall risk levels.  
There is, however, evidence contrary to this. Asiedu (2006) finds that an efficient legal 
system, less corruption and higher political stability promote FDI in Africa. Similarly, Wahid et 
al. (2009) also find that institutions, as political stability, shows up as a significant driver of FDI 
in Africa. In the case of Chinese FDI in Africa, Mourao (2017) finds that government effectiveness, 
control of corruption, political stability and regulatory quality all positively affect the efficiency 
of Chinese OFDI in Africa. One explanation as to why we may expect that Chinese multinational 
investment not to be completely insensitive to the institutional environment in a host economy has 
to do with the idea that investors can bear risks up to a certain threshold level, beyond which weak 
institutions become far too risky and hence a deterrent (Rogmans and Ebbers, 2013). This is in line 
with Aleksynska and Havrylchyk’s (2013) finding that institutions can be a driving force when 
emerging MNEs invest in host countries with better institutions, while in countries with weak 
institutions they become a deterrent for FDI. Indeed, given this institutional deterrent effect, the 
Chinese government has encouraged domestic corporations to establish partnerships when 
venturing in Africa. At a more macro level, economic cooperation with African economies through 
the triennial ‘Forum on China-Africa Cooperation’ (FOCAC) serves to reaffirm Sino-African 
economic ties and hence provide ‘insurance’ against political risk (Dupasquier and Osakwe, 2006). 
However, the promotion capacity of Chinese trade with Africa by the state is limited, as the more 
China liberalizes, the more difficult it becomes to execute state control over private firms venturing 
abroad (Taylor, 2012).  
Institutional reform in some African countries has lagged behind other developing nations 
(Dupasquier and Osakwe, 2006), particularly inadequate contract enforcement and widespread 
corruption (Ellis et al., 2015), putting Sino-African economic links at risk. Chinese investor’s 
tolerance for risk, as argued above, has a limit. ‘Continued’ poor and weak institutional governance 
(in Africa) is expected to have a larger deterrent effect on Chinese investment. We argue that this 
deterrent effect applies to any institutionally weak developing state. Strong institutions may or 
may not positively affect inbound investment in a developing country, yet we do expect and 
hypothesize that the influence to be relatively positive for Africa (given the current state of its 




Hypothesis 1b: A developing country’s institutions may be insensitive (positively related) to the 
number of Chinese CBMAs in that country. 
Hypothesis 1c: An African country’s institutions will have a larger (positive) influence (than in 
non-African developing economies) on the number of Chinese CBMAs in that country. 
 
2.2 Motivation to seek markets 
As an establishment mode compared to greenfield investment, CBMA allows MNEs to have 
greater control over international markets. This is because takeovers provide stable availability of 
products to consumers (Buckley et al., 2007; Davis and Cobb, 2010). Another reason firms might 
venture abroad is that they face a limit in their domestic market. So faced with this constraining 
domestic market and willingness for foreign market access, a market seeking motive will drive the 
multinational to engage in CBMA. The rationale behind the market seeking motive is driven by 
scale economies. The larger the host country market, one would expect the higher the degree of 
scale economies in distribution and production (Wang et al., 2012). 
In the case of China, market constraints at home have propelled Chinese firms to go abroad. 
Indeed, since the domestic market has become increasingly constraining after several decades of 
hyper economic growth, competition in all domestic industries is enormous (Rui and Yip, 2008). 
Hence, these market constraints at home may lead Chinese MNEs into CBMAs due to a market 
seeking motive. Furthermore, fierce competition between powerful global rivals from advanced 
markets, also acts as a push factor for EMNEs (Luo and Tung, 2007). Add to that the widespread 
belief that Chinese products have immense value for developing economies where consumers are 
more receptive to inexpensive goods produced by Chinese manufacturers than for products from 
advanced economies (Taylor, 2012). As there is relatively low competition in developing countries, 
market share growth potential for Chinese firms can be enormous. In short, intense competition 
faced by Chinese firms not only from foreign MNEs but also domestically emboldens them to 
move abroad. Empirically, Buckley et al. (2007), Deng and Yang (2015), Yang and Deng (2017) 
find that market size of host countries positively influences OFDI including CBMAs from China. 
This holds for both developed and developing economies. 
When it comes to Africa, market size is also found to be positively important for Chinese 
 OFDI (Cheung et al., 2012). As such, larger African markets are attractive for Chinese CBMAs. 
From a comparative perspective, however, given that domestic markets for many African countries 
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are relatively small and market attractiveness of some African economies would be lagging behind 
developing countries in other regions (Taylor, 2009), we would expect the market seeking motive 
to be less relevant in Africa compared to elsewhere.   
Henceforth, we expect market size of developing countries, including African ones, to 
facilitate the number of CBMAs by Chinese companies, which leads to the following hypotheses 
(absolute and relative respectively): 
 
Hypothesis 2a: A developing country’s market size will have a positive effect on the number of 
Chinese CBMAs in that country. 
Hypothesis 2b: An African country’s market size will have a lesser influence (than in non-African 
developing economies) on the number of Chinese CBMAs in that country. 
 
2.3 Motivation to seek natural resources 
According to the OLI paradigm and viewing the situation from a resource-based perspective, 
multinational firms who are or are planning to operate abroad rely on heterogeneous resources. In 
particular, natural resources such as minerals, natural gas, crude oil and timber are all seen as 
important to a firm’s development. MNEs may venture abroad to acquire a widely diversified set 
of resources where they obtain control of such core resources. Chinese MNEs, faced with increased 
prices for imported raw materials in China and increasingly saturated export markets have felt 
compelled to obtain their own sources of raw materials abroad (Taylor, 2012). 
In this optic, the abundance of natural resources in Africa would lead to even more Chinese 
CBMAs aggressively pursuing these raw materials. These deals are largely supported by the 
central government as continued access to various raw materials and energy can sustain China’s 
economic growth (Ellis et al., 2015). Biggeri and Sanfilippo (2009) find natural resources as one 
of the key pull factors of Chinese FDI into Africa, a finding supported by Mourao (2017). Since 
natural resources is one comparative advantage of the region and 24 African countries are 
classified by the World Bank as oil- and mineral-dependent, which accounted for three-quarters of 
annual FDI inflows over the past two decades (Wahid et al., 2009; World Bank, 2014), we expect 
resource-rich Africa to be relatively more attractive than other developing economies. Apart from 
the ‘resource-rich’ explanation, investing in other developing economies could be due to other 
‘balanced’ motives, such as the hypothesized market-seeking motive. In the absence of a market-
seeking orientation towards Africa among Chinese companies, this leaves the resource-seeking 
9 
 
motive as the preeminent reason for investing in Africa. Accordingly, we propose that Chinese 
MNEs will increase the number of CBMAs in host developing countries, but more so in African 
countries. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 3a: A developing country’s natural resources will have a positive effect on the number 
of Chinese CBMAs in that country. 
Hypothesis 3b: An African country’s natural resources will have a larger influence (than in non-
African developing economies) on the number of Chinese CBMAs in that country. 
 
2.4 Motivation to seek strategic assets 
Chinese MNEs are prompted to extensively conduct aggressive outbound acquisitions to seek 
foreign strategic assets because of the paucity of sufficient ownership advantages or competitive 
advantages in China (Deng, 2009; Rui and Yip, 2008; Liu and Woywode, 2013). Strategic assets 
including brand names, patents and advanced technologies, and managerial expertise are pursued 
by Chinese MNEs to reduce their late-comer disadvantages (Cui et al., 2014). This is exemplified 
by TCL’s acquisition of Thompson to obtain the latter’s proprietary technology and trademarks. 
Similarly, Luo and Tung (2007) view Chinese CBMAs as a springboard to acquire strategic assets, 
including technological leadership, global consumer base and high brand recognition. Boateng et 
al. (2008) examine 27 Chinese outbound M&A transactions from 2000 to 2004 based on listed 
motivations in company annual reports. They find that among the primary motives for such 
outbound M&As are strategic assets, such as technology and management know-how.  
While we expect strategic assets to be a main driving force of Chinese CBMAs, Africa is 
less likely to attract such strategic asset-seeking CBMAs. In general, multinational corporations 
possess superior intangible assets including technology than African local firms and this gap of 
technological endowments induces African countries to attract FDI to achieve technology 
spillovers or transfers (Bwalya, 2006, Managi and Bwalya, 2010; Oguji et al., 2018). Therefore, 
we posit that: 
 
Hypothesis 4a: A developing country’s strategic assets will have a positive effect on the number 
of Chinese CBMAs in that country. 
Hypothesis 4b: An African country’s strategic assets will have a lesser influence (than in non-




2.5 Motivation to seek efficiency 
While lacking conventional ownership advantages, Chinese firms enjoy several home country 
advantages such as low labor costs and sometimes high labor productivity (Bhaumik et al., 2016). 
An enormous home market and demand base enable Chinese MNEs to leverage competitive 
advantages derived from economies of scale and improve production efficiency. However, this 
notwithstanding, internationalized Chinese MNEs could benefit more from economies of scale 
than local firms. This is because expanding abroad allows these emerging-economy MNEs to 
attain a larger market which enables them to exploit economies of scale and thus improve 
efficiency (Chari and Shaikh, 2017). For instance, by analyzing Chinese firm-level data in the 
electronics industry from 2005 to 2009, Bhaumik et al. (2016) contend that scale efficiency 
contributed more to the growth of Chinese firms than the traditional firm-specific advantages 
(FSAs). Thus, Chinese firms are motivated to seek efficiency and scale economies resulting from 
CBMAs. Basically, lower (higher) the labor costs (productivity), the higher the number of CBMA 
deals by Chinese MNEs. 
While we do not expect Chinese firms to pursue CBMAs in developed countries for any 
efficiency-seeking motive, the situation is different in developing countries, as costs of labor and 
production are significantly lower than advanced economies, and these should generally magnify 
the impact of labor efficiency on Chinese CBMAs’ location decisions. 
Labor market efficiency, seen as low labor cost or high labor productivity, is expected to 
have a positive association with the number of Chinese CBMA deals in developing countries, 
which should have a magnifying effect in the African region. We hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 5a: A developing country’s labor efficiency will have a positive effect on the number 
of Chinese CBMAs in that country. 
Hypothesis 5b: An African country’s labor efficiency will have a larger influence (than in non-




2.6 Establishment mode and ownership strategies 
Most of the paper so far describes hypothesized expected variation with respect to locational 
characteristics. We now turn to hypothesized variation regarding the dependent variable, which so 
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far we have seen as (number of) CBMAs. This appears as a subset of the ‘explained’ factor in 
Figure 2. 
*** FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE *** 
It is contended that M&As are conducted for different reasons than greenfield investments. 
Greenfield investments rely on MNEs’ internal capability to build a subsidiary from scratch, while 
CBMAs mainly lead to shifting control from domestic to foreign firms. Moreover, greenfield 
investment does not involve direct interactions with foreign partners but these interactions are 
crucial for CBMAs. Hence, given these differences, greenfield investments may be determined by 
different set of factors from CBMAs (Buckley et al., 2016). In particular, we expect locational 
factors to vary for these two establishment modes.  
It is apparent that the strategic assets seeking motive is more likely to be an acquisition 
motive than a greenfield one (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Similarly, the resource seeking motive 
could also be driven more by acquisitions. For instance, as highlighted above, the need for resource 
security has driven Chinese firms abroad to secure natural resources. As natural resources cannot 
be duplicated internally and their external purchase would be too costly, greenfield investment 
could be an inferior choice compared to acquisitions. Chen (2008) finds that procurements of 
complementary capability is more likely to be the major driver for choosing CBMAs over 
greenfield investments. Thus, we expect that acquisition of target firms embedded in host 
economies with strategic assets and natural resources is a more preferable entry mode than 
greenfield investment by Chinese MNEs. 
To explore the ownership structure of Chinese CBMAs, we can classify CBMAs according 
to acquisition stakes. As part of their ‘ownership strategies’, acquiring firms can choose from 10% 
to 50% equity in target firms, which provides them with ‘voice only’ rights, whilst they get ‘voice 
and control’ if they choose an ownership strategy of more than 50% equity (Head, 2007). The 
former implies multinational investment in associates that gives them an active role but not a 
controlling interest, while the latter refers to having majority owned subsidiaries or affiliates with 
an effective managerial voice that comes with having a controlling interest (Ibid). Though 
somewhat related to the notion of ‘entry strategies’ of MNEs through partial or full acquisitions 
(Oguji and Owusu, 2017), the ownership strategies of ‘voice and control’ or ‘voice only’ differ in 
that partial deals could be minority-owned or majority-owned, with the former lacking control.  
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Because voice and control of target firms provide MNEs with high initial resource 
commitments (Chari and Chang, 2009), Chinese MNEs predominantly seek more than 50% stakes 
in target firms to gain access to critical resources through dominant ownership (Cui and Jiang, 
2009, Contractor et al., 2014). To understand why these two concepts could matter, consider the 
example of Chinese automobile manufacturer Geely’s dual acquisitions from Proton, the 
Malaysian car maker. One acquisition entailed a 49.9 per cent stake of Proton itself and the second 
was a 51 per cent stake of Proton’s British-based subsidiary, Lotus (Financial Times, 2017). This 
interesting difference of more than 1 per cent stake exemplifies the concept of voice with and 
without control. Geely’s aim was to seek sales channels in Southeast Asia which it could gain 
through partnership with a well-established brand in that market such as Proton. Thus, a minority 
stake with ‘voice only’ served its purpose well (to expand its market), given the guaranteed 
continued help from the former owners and now partners. On the contrary, Geely intended to 
deploy Lotus’s composite materials and light-weighting technology to reduce its vehicles’ 
emissions, which necessitated a majority stake of 51% with both ‘voice and control’ to gain greater 
resource access (Ibid).  
In light of the above we hypothesize, 
Hypothesis 6a: The location characteristics of host economies (developing or African) may differ 
in their effects dependent on whether the establishment mode is acquisition or greenfield. 
Hypothesis 6b: The location characteristics of host economies (developing or African) may differ 
in their effects dependent on whether the acquisitions are majority-owned (voice & control) or not 
(voice only). 
 
3.  Data and methods 
The dependent variable in this study is the ‘number of CBMAs by Chinese MNEs in developing 
countries from 2007 to 2016, which is drawn from the Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum 
provided by Thomson Financial. It was measured by the total number of complete Chinese CBMA 
deals in each developing country in each year, which created a panel data of country-year. We also 
divide the number of Chinese CBMAs into the number of deals with voice and control and with 
voice only. Though SDC Platinum is our preferred CBMA data source because of its extensive 
coverage, as an M&A database it does not have information on greenfield investment. Therefore, 
the ‘number of Chinese greenfield investments’ is drawn from the Global Investment Tracker (GIT) 
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database by the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation. As the GIT dataset 
contains only large transactions worth over 100 million US dollars, for comparative purposes we 
also use the ‘number of Chinese CBMAs’ from the data source. 
The definition of developing countries is drawn from the classifications by the World Bank, 
which includes all low income, lower-middle income and upper-middle income countries but 
excludes high-income economies. The reason why we use the number of CBMA transactions 
instead of CBMA value is twofold. Firstly, missing information on CBMA values in the SDC 
database reduces our sample significantly. Secondly, the value of deals can be extremely large or 
small, thus may distort the degree of CBMA involvement by Chinese MNEs. Therefore, the 
number of CBMAs is more appropriate for our study as we assign 1 evenly and equally to each 
transaction of each country every year regardless of their values. It is worthwhile mentioning that 
we set the number of deals in developing countries as defined by the World Bank that are not 
included in SDC databases as zero throughout the period of 2007-2016. 
To explore the role of natural resources we draw information from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI). The resource variable employed is total resource rents (as % of 
GDP). The ‘resource rents’ variable is used as a proxy for natural resources because we assume 
that all natural resources including oil, natural gas and mineral are of interest to Chinese MNEs. 
The ‘market size’ variable is taken from the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) of the World 
Economic Forum to proxy the market size of the host country. ‘Patents’ applications by residents 
(the number of patents in the host country) taken from the WDI is the proxy for strategic assets of 
host countries.  
We use output per worker (GDP constant 2011 international $ in PPP) taken from the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) database to represent ‘labor productivity’ and thus proxy 
labor efficiency. 
The World Governance Indicators (WGI) database is used to proxy the governance-related 
institutional environment of a developing country. There are in total six indices of institutional 
governance; voice and accountability; political stability; government effectiveness; regulatory 
quality; rule of law; control of corruption. After analyzing each of the six proxies of institutions, 
finally, an overall measure of institutional governance, the six indices totaled, is adopted to proxy 
the overall institutional environment of a developing country. 
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The effect of time is controlled for by a time trend variable. Controlling for a time effect is 
necessary for two principal reasons. First, there is a rising trend of Chinese CBMAs during the 
period (see Figure 1). Second, common time-specific factors affecting all economies alike could 
impinge on the decision to invest. For example, changes in the relative exchange rate can make it 
attractive for Chinese companies to invest in developing economies including in Africa, or there 
could be changes to the China-Africa relationship over time. Indeed, the China-Africa economic 
relationship has gradually improved over time due to the advent of the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC) (Taylor, 2012), and as a result one would expect the overseas acquisition 
strategy of Chinese companies may have reflected such changes. 
In addition, ‘Africa’ is a dummy variable, which takes value 1 when the developing country 
is an African economy and 0 otherwise. This is used to test Hypothesis 1. Five interactive terms – 
Market size*Africa, Resources rents*Africa, Patents*Africa, Labor productivity*Africa and 
Institutions*Africa –and the Africa dummy variable are included to test Hypotheses 2b, 3b, 4b, 5b 
and 6b. These interactive terms measure the relative/differential effect of locational determinants 
on Chinese CBMAs in African countries. Because the dependent variable is the number of CBMAs 
in developing economies that are nonnegative integers and range from 0 to 7, standard least squares 
regression is improper under the circumstance. Therefore, the Poisson model and negative 
binomial model are considered to deal with the count nature of the data. However, the Poisson 
model makes a strong assumption that the mean and variance are the same. This may be unrealistic 
for our data and in many situations this may not be the case. As the negative binomial model 
adjusts the variance independently from the mean, we adopt this model. 
As our data is a set of longitudinal panel data containing repeated observations across years, 
our analysis can be subjected to biases related to lack of independence and unobserved 
heterogeneity that may lead to underestimation of the true standard error. To address these issues, 
we employed a random-effects negative binomial model. In addition, we take one-year lag of 
market size, resources rents, patents, labor productivity, and institutions to avoid possible 
endogeneity issue. 
The variables are in natural logarithm which reduces extreme variability and allows for 
more interpretable coefficients in terms of percent change. We study five locational determinants 
of Chinese CBMAs in developing countries, namely market size, resources rents, patents, labor 
productivity, and institutions, with a particular interest on examining whether there are differential 
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effects of these five locational determinants on African countries compared to other developing 
counterparts. In addition, these same locational factors are compared in their effects on CBMA 
with voice and control to voice only, and their effects between CBMA and greenfield investment. 
 
4. Results 
The correlation matrix and summary statistics of the variables are presented in Table 1 and Table 
2 respectively. It can be seen that the variables are not highly correlated to each other, except for 
the correlation between market size and residents’ patents (0.72). We report our findings with these 
two variables both together and separately in our regression models. 
*** TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE *** 
*** TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE *** 
Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 report the regression results of the panel negative binomial estimation. In 
all tables, Model 1 accounts for market size in Africa by incorporating the interactive term market 
size multiplied by Africa; similarly, model 2 to model 5 account for natural resources, strategic 
assets, labor productivity and institutions in Africa respectively by incorporating interactive terms 
with the Africa dummy variable. As indicated earlier, we also run these regressions with market 
size and patents both together and separately. The only noticeable effect is on the market size 
variable (see Appendix 1). Tables 3 and 6 use CBMA data from SDC Platinum for estimation, 
while Tables 4 and 5 report the results for greenfield investment and CBMAs based on the Global 
Investment Tracker dataset (the latter to have a comparison between entry mode when one 
information source is used). Table 6 presents the results for interactive African dummies according 
to two dependent variables; the number of Chinese CBMAs with voice and control and the number 
of Chinese CBMAs with voice only. It can be noted that regression models fit well with the data 
as the Wald χ2 are all significant at 1% level of significance and the Pseudo R2 range from 7% to 
8%, which appear reasonable compared to other CBMAs studies. 
Our interpretation for support (or not) of hypothesis H1a should be based not just on the Africa 
dummy variable but also the interactive dummies in each regression. This is because the sign of 
the Africa dummy is both positive and negative (which does not necessarily make this more or less 
attractive). The inference is, although Africa is ‘generally’ speaking an unattractive destination 
because of its institutional lacunae, including unfavorable market conditions, certain ‘specific’ 
characteristics (such as natural resources) make it attractive.  
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*** TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE *** 
Turning to the variables in level form and whether there is support for developing countries’ 
market, resources, strategic assets, labor efficiency and institutions having generally a positive 
association with Chinese CBMAs, we find weak support for the market-seeking hypothesis H2a 
or some support when we consider large investments only (Table 3 vs. Tables 4 and 5). Instead, 
the strong support for resource-seeking hypothesis H3a is limited to CBMAs only (Tables 3 & 5 
vs. Table 4), and strategic assets seeking hypothesis H4a is supported across regressions 
irrespective of establishment mode or size of investment. We do not find support for the efficiency-
seeking hypothesis H5a. In short, there is evidence to the effect that Chinese firms are attracted to 
the developing world by markets and resources (conditional on investment size and establishment 
mode), attracted to endowment of strategic assets, but not the efficiency-seeking motive. 
*** TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE *** 
*** TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE *** 
So some of these findings correspond to our expectations and are in line with previous 
empirical studies (Buckley et al., 2007, Kolstad and Wiig, 2012, Yang and Deng, 2017). The fact 
that labor efficiency is negatively signed can be rationalized by the fact that Chinese firms may 
have already achieved efficiency at home and as such this factor does not play as much of a role. 
It is with respect to hypothesis H1b that we find evidence contrary to what past studies have 
found. We stipulated an uncertain two-sided hypothesis, instead of a one-sided hypothesis. Thus, 
this is somewhat contrary to our Hypothesis 1b, as the influence is clearly positive and significant 
(only positive in Tables 4 & 5). More concretely, the coefficients of all five models in Table 3 are 
positive and significant at 1% (p<.001), but positively signed and insignificant for results in Tables 
4 and 5. This means unlike past studies, we find that strong institutions matter in a positive manner 
for most Chinese acquisitions, except for large investors. The rationale being that large investors 
have the capability to navigate difficult institutional terrain, with the explanation of difference with 
past studies being due to our focus on ‘number of deals’ rather than the ‘value amount of 
investment’. 
Moving to our central question: is Africa unique and different when it comes to attracting 
Chinese CBMAs? Here we need to look at all interactive terms with the Africa dummy variable. 
According to result in Model 1 of Table 3, Hypothesis 2b is somewhat supported, such that the 
market-seeking motive is of lesser relevance in Africa vis-à-vis its other developing counterparts. 
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This effect is more pronounced when we consider Model 1 without the strategic assets variable, 
namely Patents, with which it is correlated (see Appendix table). This means that Africa’s market 
size is less effective in attracting Chinese CBMAs, and the market size of non-African developing 
countries will generate more Chinese CBMAs than that of Africa. One possible interpretation is 
that Africa’s market is fragmented and lacks regionalism of a single market that is large enough to 
attract Chinese CBMAs (Asiedu, 2006). 
With regards to natural resources, Table 1 shows a positive and weak differential effect on the 
interactive term of total resources and Africa (p<.1). This would seem to suggest there is only 
weak evidence of a differential effect for natural resources in Africa. However, according to Tables 
4 and 5, Chinese CBMAs are significantly driven by developing countries’ natural resources while 
this resource-seeking motive is less relevant for Chinese greenfield investments. More 
significantly, natural resources in African countries attract more Chinese CBMAs than in other 
developing countries, which suggests Chinese CBMAs’ explicit and pronounced intention to 
procure Africa’s natural resources. This supports our expectation that resources in Africa are 
mainly pursued by Chinese MNEs CBMAs rather than greenfield investments (Hypothesis 6a). 
*** TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE *** 
Furthermore, according to Table 6 (Panel A), Africa’s natural resources significantly drive 
Chinese CBMAs with voice and control (p<.01), but this positive effect is absent for CBMAs with 
voice only (Panel B). Thus, there is some support for Hypothesis 6b. To be precise, we find that 
Africa’s natural resources propel the CBMAs with majority stakes, which indicates Chinese MNEs’ 
predominant preference for majority ownership and control over acquired African natural 
resources. 
Though this seems in line with past findings that China’s investment in Africa is primarily 
motivated by natural resources (Frynas and Paulo, 2006), this needs to be interpreted in the 
comparative context where this inference is drawn and that there is the added point of ownership 
with control. Indeed, our study is casting a comparative lens between African and developing 
economies. This finding shows that Chinese investors’ strategy to obtain strategic resources is 
conducted via acquisitions (rather than greenfield) and this motive is more pronounced if they are 
with ‘controlling interests’. The effects of interactive terms of institutions, strategic assets and 
labor productivity are all insignificant, with no support for Hypotheses 1c, 4b and 5b. This implies 
that Chinese investors treat African and non-African developing regions alike as far as strategic 
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assets, labor efficiency and institutions are concerned. As such, Africa is not different in terms of 
these locational factors, but are significantly different in terms markets and resources. 
Chinese MNEs are less market seeking in Africa and mostly enter via CBMAs rather than 
greenfield investments by majority ownership to exercise control on natural resources. We 
interpret this as supportive evidence in favor of our central proposition that Africa is uniquely 




This study has investigated host country determinants of Chinese CBMAs in developing countries 
and the differential effect of Africa on such CBMA deals over the 2007-2016 period. Drawing 
from a comparative institution-based view, it studies the role market size, natural resources, 
strategic assets, labor efficiency, and institutions have on the number of Chinese CBMAs in 
developing economies (including Africa). One contribution of this study is at the intersection of 
two streams of the literature: Chinese CBMAs and CBMAs in Africa – with emphasis on providing 
a comparative perspective between African and other developing economies. As such this paper 
contributed to an extension of the current literature by shedding light on our understanding of 
Chinese multinational CBMAs in the developing world (comparatively with Africa). 
Our study shows that a large market, available strategic assets, adequate natural resources, and 
strong institutions matter for Chinese multinational acquisitions in the developing world, but labor 
efficiency does not. The hypothesized ‘distinctive’ effect of Africa compared to other developing 
countries is shown to be present only for the market-seeking and resource-seeking motives. With 
respect to the African market, Chinese acquisitions appear to be relatively less drawn to Africa by 
a market seeking motive. 
Yet when it comes to natural resources we see Chinese investors develop an ‘investment 
strategy’ that is Africa-specific. This strategy entails using M&A as the mode of entry instead of 
greenfield investment in the process of acquiring natural resources. In addition, this CBMA is 
conducted through majority-ownership (voice & control), as opposed to having voice in 
management only, to enable greater controlling interests over acquired natural resources. The 
inference is that Chinese MNEs view Africa as ‘significantly’ distinct due to its abundant raw 
materials. This finding contributes to our understanding of how Chinese MNEs conduct their 
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acquisitions in the developing world and how they treat Africa differently, especially when it  
comes to the resource-seeking motive. 
This implication of a strategy of majority ownership over African firms to secure access to 
African resources may compound the ‘resource curse’ problem that has plagued Africa. For 
instance, Africa’s under-industrialized energy industries are vulnerable to negative price shocks 
resulting from Chinese involvement, which deepens Africa’s dependency on energy and may 
hamper industry diversification and broad economic prosperity (Leonard and Straus, 2003; Taylor, 
2009). The potential issue of a resource curse sounds out a cautionary note to the endeavor of 
Chinese CBMAs in Africa. Currently, Chinese CBMAs have been unbalanced in China’s favor 
and African governments should become more engaged in Sino-Africa economic ties such as 
taking advantage of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), especially in infrastructure sectors, 
and regulate Sino-African energy policy to improve governance of natural resources in Chinese 
CBMAs (Du and Zhang, 2018). 
The finding of CBMA being different to greenfield investment, especially for the resource-
seeking motive, adds to our understanding that it may be problematic to investigate Chinese OFDI 
as a whole, given the motives of greenfield and CBMAs do differ. While extant studies largely 
investigate Chinese OFDI as a whole, our evidence shows these two entry strategies are different 
particularly in developing economies. 
 
5.2 Theoretical implications 
We have used a comparative institutional analysis grounded in a comparative institution-based 
view. Our work provides theoretical insights to better understand FDI location choice. Extant FDI 
theories document the role of location characteristics in determining investment choices of MNEs 
(Dunning and Lundan, 2008). This study suggests these locational factors ‘comparatively’ bear on 
such investment decision. This reflects investors’ selection processes in location choices. Market 
seeking FDI, for example, is not only guided by the host economy’s market size or potential, but 
the latter’s market ‘relative’ to other potential hosts.     
Our results suggest that it is imperative to analyze CBMA in Africa from a comparative 
institution-based view. Only comparing antecedents of CBMAs in Africa relative to the ones in 
other developing economies can answer the questions whether and how different African countries 
are in attracting foreign acquisitions. For instance, without comparisons between African 
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economies and developing economies in other regions, studies reach the conclusion that Chinese 
investment into Africa is driven by natural resources and that is irrespective of the weak 
institutional setting of the continent (Rogmans and Ebbers, 2013). However, comparative 
characteristics of Africa enable us to challenge this viewpoint, as strong institutional governance 
mattered both for African and non-African economies although Chinese investors are not 
especially deterred by weak institutions of Africa. This aligns with the view of a few scholars who 
contend the same (Brautigam, 2009; Chen et al., 2018). Therefore, a comparative institution-based 
view helps us to identify the underlying distinct antecedents of Chinese CBMAs in Africa, which 
is also urged by previous studies on Chinese CBMA’s calling for more comparative studies on 
cross-border M&As (Aybar and Ficici, 2009; Nicholson and Salaber, 2013).  
 
5.3 Managerial implications 
From an international business perspective, this study shows some key factors in acquiring firms 
in developing countries. Hence, Chinese firms may regard these factors as indicators for cross-
border investment opportunities. This study is informative with regard the foreign entry strategies 
of emerging market MNEs for acquisitions in the developing world. It shows how such foreign 
entry strategies (including establishment modes) are moderated by the ‘distinctiveness’ of the host 
and the interplay with the ownership strategies of the MNEs. The acquisition of strategic resources 
is motivated by the need to control access to said resources. Furthermore, attractiveness in 
investing in developing hosts lies in having large markets, marketable natural resources and 
strategic assets, and strong institutional governance.    
 
5.4 Limitations and future research directions 
Some limitations of this effort must be recognized. Firstly, given the homogenous characteristics 
of each African region, sub-sample analysis of Sub-Saharan African countries, Northern African 
countries and other subgroups could be meaningful. Secondly, it is worthwhile comparing different 
impacts of locational determinants on the number and value of CBMAs. Finally, future research 
may also incorporate home country motives of CBMAs, in particular, home countries’ institutional 
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 Note: N=855. *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1. All variables except dummies variables 
are in log form and lagged by one year. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
   
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. No. of CBMAs 1.00      
2. Market size 0.29*** 1.00     
3. Resources rents 0.06* -0.07** 1.00    
4. Patents 0.38*** 0.72*** -0.14*** 1.00   
5. Labor productivity 0.17*** 0.44*** -0.21*** 0.48*** 1.00  
6. Institutions 0.12*** -0.03 -0.35*** 0.12*** 0.33*** 1.00 
Variables Mean SD Max Min 
No. of CBMAs 0.24 0.74 6.00 0.00 
Market size 1.12 0.38 1.83 -1.12 
Resources rents 1.54 1.67 4.10 -6.77 
Patents 3.07 2.69 10.28 0.00 
Labor productivity 9.57 0.93 11.47 7.45 
Institutions 5.37 1.28 8.08 0.96 
Resources rents * Africa 0.85 1.44 4.10 -6.77 
Patents * Africa 0.66 1.51 6.82 0.00 
Labor productivity * Africa 3.68 4.52 11.47 0.00 
Institutions * Africa 2.12 2.72 8.08 0.00 
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Table 3. Panel Negative Binomial Results for the Number of Chinese CBMAs 
 Dependent Variable: No. of Chinese CBMAs 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Time trend 0.026 0.030 0.026 0.030 0.028 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Africa 2.306* -1.653* 0.195 -3.065 -0.386 
 (1.22) (0.89) (0.59) (3.20) (1.47) 
Market size 2.009** 1.182* 1.208* 1.129* 1.219* 
 (0.79) (0.66) (0.68) (0.67) (0.68) 
Resources rents 0.381*** 0.324** 0.373*** 0.410*** 0.393*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Patents 0.286*** 0.343*** 0.347*** 0.333*** 0.318*** 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) 
Labor productivity -0.215 -0.382** -0.322 -0.529** -0.363* 
 (0.21) (0.19) (0.20) (0.27) (0.20) 
Institutions 0.459*** 0.505*** 0.458*** 0.483*** 0.458*** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) 
Market size * Africa -2.024
**     
 (0.93)     
Resources rents * Africa  0.631
*    
  (0.36)    
Patents * Africa   -0.112   
   (0.12)   
Labor productivity * Africa    0.287  
    (0.33)  
Institutions * Africa     0.022 
     (0.25) 
Constant -5.766*** -3.473* -3.880** -1.879 -3.385* 
 (2.17) (1.84) (1.94) (2.58) (1.97) 
      
Number of observations 855 855 855 855 855 
Log Likelihood -374.10 -375.17 -376.34 -376.41 -376.78 
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.073 0.070 0.070 0.069 
Wald χ2 90.19*** 88.66*** 85.38*** 87.57*** 83.10*** 
Note: *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1. All two-tail tests. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 





Table 4. Results for the Number of Chinese CBMAs with Voice & Control and 
with Voice only 
Note: *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1. To save space we report interactive terms only, with the other 
explanatory variables though included in the estimation but not reported. 
  
Panel A: CBMAs with voice and control 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Market size * Africa -1.869     
 (1.36)     
Resources rents * Africa  1.387
***    
  (0.53)    
Patents * Africa   -0.105   
   (0.17)   
Labour productivity * Africa    0.385  
    (0.53)  
Institutions * Africa     -0.052 
     (0.41) 
Panel B: CBMAs with voice only 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Market size * Africa -0.893     
 (1.41)     
Resources rents * Africa  -0.292    
  (0.52)    
Patents * Africa   -0.006   
   (0.19)   
Labour productivity * Africa    0.582  
    (0.46)  
Institutions * Africa     0.514 
     (0.38) 
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Table 5. Results for the Number of Chinese Greenfield Investments (using Global 
Investment Tracker) 
 Dependent Variable: No. of Chinese greenfield investments 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Time trend 0.134*** 0.141*** 0.136*** 0.138*** 0.136*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Africa 2.871** 0.309 0.264 -0.424 0.281 
 (1.26) (0.53) (0.53) (3.68) (1.21) 
Market size 3.191*** 1.807*** 1.837*** 1.784** 1.842*** 
 (0.89) (0.69) (0.69) (0.71) (0.70) 
Resources rents 0.104 0.183 0.102 0.115 0.108 
 (0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Patents 0.154* 0.226*** 0.250*** 0.224** 0.214** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Labor productivity -0.557** -0.681*** -0.638*** -0.660** -0.637*** 
 (0.22) (0.24) (0.23) (0.31) (0.23) 
Institutions 0.081 0.053 0.056 0.066 0.090 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) 
Market size * Africa -2.463**     
 (0.99)     
Resources rents * Africa  -0.217    
  (0.21)    
Patents * Africa   -0.121   
   (0.13)   
Labor productivity * Africa    0.036  
    (0.39)  
Institutions * Africa     -0.070 
     (0.22) 
Constant 14.648 15.040 18.496 15.663 15.165 
 (872.19) (625.02) (423.17) (637.09) (765.56) 
Number of observations 855 855 855 855 855 
Log likelihood  -399.686 -402.21 -402.291 -402.716 -402.67 
Pseudo R2 0.115 0.110 0.109 0.108 0.109 
Wald χ2 64.92*** 60.69*** 60.3*** 59.78*** 59.93*** 








Table 6. Results for the Number of Chinese CBMAs (using Global Investment Tracker) 
 Dependent Variable: No. of Chinese CBMAs 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Time trend 0.135*** 0.141*** 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.137*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Africa 2.233 -1.954** 0.503 2.772 0.520 
 (1.40) (0.99) (0.62) (4.10) (1.29) 
Market size 2.722*** 1.780** 1.804** 1.974** 1.880** 
 (0.93) (0.76) (0.77) (0.80) (0.78) 
Resources rents 0.374*** 0.285** 0.344** 0.370*** 0.381*** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Patents 0.179* 0.262*** 0.284*** 0.207** 0.224** 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) 
Labor productivity -0.155 -0.333 -0.243 -0.125 -0.316 
 (0.26) (0.24) (0.25) (0.36) (0.25) 
Institutions 0.137 0.164 0.120 0.128 0.182 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) 
Market size * Africa -2.002*     
 (1.08)     
Resources rents * Africa  0.751**    
  (0.38)    
Patents * Africa   -0.224*   
   (0.13)   
Labor productivity * Africa    -0.314  
    (0.42)  
Institutions * Africa     -0.150 
     (0.24) 
Constant -4.249 -1.549 -2.606 -3.497 -1.893 
 (2.68) (2.27) (2.31) (3.50) (2.39) 
Number of observations 855 855 855 855 855 
Log likelihood  -310.03 -309.71 -310.32 -311.44 -311.52 
Pseudo R2 0.155 0.156 0.154 0.151 0.151 
Wald χ2 66.28*** 66.01*** 65.5*** 62.97*** 62.8*** 









Table A1. Results without patents or without market size 
 Model 1 without patents Model 3 without market size 
Market size 3.873***  
 (0.64)  
Market size * Africa -2.778***  
 (0.98)  
Patents   0.460*** 
  (0.07) 
Patents * Africa  -0.118 
  (0.12) 
Note: *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1. To save space the other explanatory variables though 
included but not reported. 
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